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ABSTRACT
Objective: We describe a detailed solution for maintaining high-capacity, data-intensive network flows (eg, 10,
40, 100 Gbpsþ) in a scientific, medical context while still adhering to security and privacy laws and regulations.
Materials and Methods: High-end networking, packet-filter firewalls, network intrusion-detection systems.
Results:We describe a “Medical Science DMZ” concept as an option for secure, high-volume transport of large,
sensitive datasets between research institutions over national research networks, and give 3 detailed descrip-
tions of implemented Medical Science DMZs.
Discussion: The exponentially increasing amounts of “omics” data, high-quality imaging, and other rapidly
growing clinical datasets have resulted in the rise of biomedical research “Big Data.” The storage, analysis, and
network resources required to process these data and integrate them into patient diagnoses and treatments
have grown to scales that strain the capabilities of academic health centers. Some data are not generated lo-
cally and cannot be sustained locally, and shared data repositories such as those provided by the National Li-
brary of Medicine, the National Cancer Institute, and international partners such as the European Bioinformatics
Institute are rapidly growing. The ability to store and compute using these data must therefore be addressed by
a combination of local, national, and industry resources that exchange large datasets. Maintaining data-
intensive flows that comply with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and other regu-
lations presents a new challenge for biomedical research. We describe a strategy that marries performance and
security by borrowing from and redefining the concept of a Science DMZ, a framework that is used in physical
sciences and engineering research to manage high-capacity data flows.
Conclusion: By implementing a Medical Science DMZ architecture, biomedical researchers can leverage the
scale provided by high-performance computer and cloud storage facilities and national high-speed research
networks while preserving privacy and meeting regulatory requirements.
VC The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Medical Informatics Association.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/),
which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact
journals.permissions@oup.com 267
Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, 25(3), 2018, 267–274
doi: 10.1093/jamia/ocx104
Advance Access Publication Date: 6 October 2017
Research and Applications
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jamia/article-abstract/25/3/267/4367749
by Ruth Lilly Medical Library user
on 29 August 2018
Key words: computer communication networks, data-intensive science, high-performance computing, biomedical research,
computer security, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
INTRODUCTION
“Big Data”1 now plays as significant a role in medical science as it
does in other facets of modern life. However, storage, computation,
and transfer needs to process the data are growing rapidly in medical
schools, outstripping the capacity of on-premise IT resources. Two
basic options are available to address this problem. The first is cloud
computing using public “clouds” like Amazon and Google, “secure”
clouds offered by telecommunication firms and other companies, or
on-premise private clouds. Precision medicine will require participa-
tion in a national federation of interlinked data repositories and
high-performance computing (HPC), cloud computing, and storage
facilities that will serve biomedical researchers and ultimately care
providers. Data generated by increasingly high-throughput and in-
creasingly distributed sequencers and imaging facilities will need to
be integrated with rapidly expanding national repositories of refer-
ence data such as The Cancer Genome Atlas. Any precision medi-
cine effort will need to combine locally managed data, distributed
reference data, and local and national computational services.
The National Institutes of Health are spearheading a “commons”
initiative for data sharing, and have long provided reference data
through the National Library of Medicine. The National Cancer Insti-
tute is exploring this option by funding a number of cloud “pilots”
for cancer genomics.2 National HPC facilities available at many aca-
demic institutions3 are applying their capacity to biomedical research.
These efforts are interconnected by high-capacity research networks
such as Internet2, ESnet, and the Corporation for Education Network
Initiatives in California. These networks are part of the so-called re-
search and education (R&E) network ecosystem, which provides
high-performance networks designed specifically for large-scale sci-
ence and engineering data to interconnect research institutions glob-
ally. Such resources have traditionally been leveraged for applications
at scale, such as high-energy physics research (eg, the Large Hadron
Collider experiments, which use the Open Science Grid4), astronomy,
climate modeling, and other “big science” initiatives that compute at
the petaFLOPS scale. However, implementing large-scale computing
and data storage for medical applications presents a number of chal-
lenges for academic medical centers, particularly security and regula-
tory compliance. Protecting patient privacy has not, however,
traditionally been part of the equation in high-performance comput-
ing. Many organizations, such as the Coalition for Advanced
Scientific Computing, are helping HPC centers meet Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) require-
ments in response to this need.
In order for precision medicine and other Big Data health care
research strategies to be successful, there must be a national strategy
for the secure transfer of patient data at scale. Many organizations
are now working to meet HIPAA and HITECH requirements for
their systems in response to this need. A de facto technical control in
environments subject to regulations such as the HIPAA Security
Rule5 is to employ commercial firewalls. However, a significant ten-
sion exists between the standards that reference firewalls for sensi-
tive data6 and the performance and throughput requirements needed
for data-intensive science. Specifically, a very small number of
dropped packets, due to stateful and/or deep packet–inspecting fire-
walls, can lead to a severe degradation in network throughput.7,8
The Science DMZ model is used in many scientific environments to
solve performance problems for data-intensive science.
A Science DMZ is a portion of the network, built at or near the
local network perimeter of an individual research institution, that is
designed such that the equipment, configuration, and security poli-
cies are optimized for high-performance workflows and large data-
sets.7,8 A Science DMZ is typically connected to an R&E network at
high speed to allow the resources in the local Science DMZ to con-
nect to other Science DMZs with the performance necessary to sup-
port large-scale data-intensive science. The basic Science DMZ
model has been successfully implemented in numerous scenarios, in-
cluding those involving astrophysics, photon science, high-energy
physics, materials science, climate modeling, and genomics.7,8 These
efforts have been notably recognized by the National Science Foun-
dation, which has awarded multiple rounds of funding to US aca-
demic institutions (as part of the Campus Cyberinfrastructure
program9) to construct Science DMZ environments on their cam-
puses to support research at scale.
The Science DMZ architecture also maintains the security of the
data through a number of distinct techniques, but does not employ
commercial firewalls due to their negative impact on performance.
As a result, the Science DMZ model is not currently employed in
environments subject to the HIPAA Security Rule5 and HITECH
requirements, due to the presumed technical controls based on de
facto use of stateful and deep packet–inspecting commercial fire-
walls.5 We believe that this problem has a solution, however.
We have taken a central of tenet of the Science DMZ7,8 and reen-
gineered it for restricted data as a Medical Science DMZ.10 Science
DMZs operate at scale using already-provisioned software and au-
thentication stack as well as mature services at each site. Creating a
high-capacity, secure, data-intensive enclave within each research in-
stitution and at major data repositories allows scientists across the
country to securely move datasets at scale to the appropriate compu-
tational resources based on the trust relationships that govern each
science collaboration. This provides the ability to compute on the
data at scales previously reserved for much larger physical sciences
and engineering problems, but at much lower cost and with much
less effort than using commercial clouds.
While HIPAA defines and mandates certain safeguards, it allows
latitude in addressing those safeguards. More importantly, it shifts
the focus to risk-centric, as opposed to control-centric, practices.
This approach to security is more nuanced and includes factors such
as cost, likelihood of exploitation, impact, etc. To reflect this philos-
ophy, we have defined a Medical Science DMZ as a method or ap-
proach that allows data flows at scale while simultaneously
addressing the HIPAA Security Rule and related regulations govern-
ing biomedical data and appropriately managing risk. We emphasize
use cases that involve scientists transferring and processing medical
research data that have very different requirements than those of
medical centers communicating with suppliers, service providers,
and employees. Our network design pattern addresses Big Data and
can be implemented using a combination of physical, administrative,
and technical safeguards.
In this paper, we describe details of 3 implementations and how
they balance the key aspects of a Medical Science DMZ of high-
throughput and regulatory compliance.
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BACKGROUND
According to National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) publication 800-41, firewalls are “devices or programs that
control the flow of network traffic between networks or hosts that
employ differing security postures.”11 NIST 800-41 defines multiple
different types of firewalls, including:
• Packet-filtering firewalls that use attributes of the packet headers,
such as destination addresses, source addresses, and other
options, as the basis for their access control decisions.
• Stateful firewalls that implement their own protocol state
machines and track the connection state in the same way the end
hosts do, and are thus able to detect protocol-level anomalies
and other threats that a simple packet filter cannot.
• Application-layer firewalls that examine the contents of the
packets and messages and grants or denies access based on in-
ferred application state (eg, by detecting malicious web content
destined for a web browser).
While NIST 800-41 has a rich and nuanced view of the
breadth of firewall types and capabilities, the commercial market-
place only defines stateful firewalls and application firewalls as
“firewalls.” Whereas a packet-filtering router is not considered to
be a firewall by many commercial providers, the standards body
considered authoritative in matters of US government policy,
NIST, does consider a packet-filtering router to be a firewall,
albeit a simple one.
From the perspective of NIST 800-41, a Science DMZ uses a
nonstateful packet-filter firewall that is implemented in the gateway
or a downstream router (this is how NIST 800-41 defines the
packet-filtering router that is a key component of a standard Science
DMZ). The packet enters the firewall, and its source and destination
addresses are compared to a list of rules. If it matches any of those
rules, the action associated with the rule (forward or discard) takes
place. In addition, other compensating controls are often employed
in a Science DMZ, such as the use of an intrusion detection system
(IDS) (eg, the Bro system12,13) or an intrusion prevention system
(IPS) (eg, Snort14). A capable Science DMZ router (again, called a
firewall by NIST 800-41) can usually be configured to copy every
packet it receives and send that to an IDS. The IDS analyzes the
packets and, based on the result of its analysis, can take action to
block or otherwise interfere with any hostile traffic.
CLASSICAL SCIENCE DMZ
In a classical Science DMZ, shown in Figure 1, a network enclave is
constructed using high-performance equipment (typically one or
more switches/routers) at or near the institutional network perime-
ter. Because it is at the network perimeter, the resources in the Sci-
ence DMZ have ready high-performance access to the global R&E
network infrastructure and therefore have high-performance access
to the resources in other Science DMZs, so long as security policies
and trust relationships permit such access. High-performance serv-
ers, called data transfer nodes (DTNs), are connected directly to
these high-performance routers in the Science DMZ. The DTNs
handle all data ingest/export tasks, so the DTNs are the focus of se-
curity policy for the Science DMZ (other than the protection of the
Science DMZ infrastructure itself). The security controls for the
DTN are implemented by the router to which the DTN is directly
connected. Additional layers of security are typically implemented
as well: the DTN typically runs host-based firewalls or IDS pack-
ages; a network IDS such as Bro is often employed; and the set of
applications running on the DTN is strictly limited to system main-
tenance and data ingest/export tasks. This limitation of applications
on the DTN is a critical point – it dramatically reduces the network-
visible attack surface, and it makes the DTN a better fit for
risk-based security controls that can be implemented using high-
performance technologies (and, in particular, without commercial
stateful or application firewalls).
10GE
10GE
10GE
10GE
10GE
Border Router
WAN
Science DMZ
Switch/Router
Enterprise Border
Router/Firewall
Site / Campus
LAN
High performance
Data Transfer Node
with high-speed storage
Per-service
security policy
control points
Clean,
High-bandwidth
WAN path
Site / Campus
access to Science
DMZ resources
perfSONAR
perfSONAR
High Latency WAN Path
Low Latency LAN Path
perfSONAR
Figure 1. Classical Science DMZ.
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So designed, a Science DMZ is resistant to a wide variety of
attacks. If the data-transfer tools deployed on the DTNs implement
in-flight data encryption for all transfers, the data are not accessible
to adversaries that might snoop on the communication between the
Science DMZs that share a trust relationship. The stateless firewall
(implemented by the Science DMZ switch or router) controls which
DTNs exchange data, limiting the scope of data exfiltration. The
IDS monitors both for policy infractions and for incoming hostile
activity. The limitation of the application set on the DTNs limits the
ways in which an attacker can compromise the system (and then
only from an external host that is permitted by the stateless firewall
capabilities in the Science DMZ). All of this can be done in a way
that preserves the high-performance data-transfer capabilities neces-
sary for effective collaboration in the era of Big Data.
If confidentiality is required (eg, encryption in flight or encryp-
tion at rest), these policies can be implemented and enforced on the
DTN. In addition, if an IDS is employed, it can monitor the DTN
traffic to ensure that the policies are in fact being followed. This de-
fense in depth can serve as an important cross-check for DTN con-
figuration changes, and is especially powerful in operational
environments where the IDS policies are not routinely modified at
the same time as the DTN configuration.
The flexibility of the Science DMZ model allows for multiple
sub-enclaves within an institution, each with its own risk profile, se-
curity policies, compensating controls, etc. This segmentation of risk
and the ability to apply sets of specific controls to sub-enclaves as re-
quired make the Science DMZ model applicable to a wide variety of
network designs, threat models, and data protection requirements.
The following case studies describe the addition of capabilities to
the classical Science DMZ, enhancing it for use in environments
with protected data.
MEDICAL SCIENCE DMZ ARCHITECTURES
We reiterate that the focus of the Medical Science DMZ design is
distinct from that of patient-centric medical center networks. The
latter, for example, is well advised to employ techniques such as
IPSs and virtual private networks (VPNs) that are not currently ca-
pable of scaling to the data volumes associated with data-intensive
medical research. For example, the University of Chicago has 1500
users per day accessing data from the Genomic Data Commons at
10–20 Gbps (in aggregate, sometimes higher) over a Medical Science
DMZ. All sensitive data flows are encrypted. The University of Chi-
cago (for example) cannot handle this use case with VPNs. In con-
trast, a medical center uses VPNs so it can communicate with its
suppliers, service providers, and employees, a starkly different use
case.
As such, the goal of the Science DMZ, including the Medical Sci-
ence DMZ, is to enable high-performance transfer of data at scale
while maintaining adequate security. We note that safeguards such
as IPSs can still be implemented institutionally to provide additional
controls.
In this section, we describe 3 different approaches to building a
Medical Science DMZ. Indiana University, Harvard University, and
the University of Chicago all use a non-firewalled approach to
HIPAA in their Medical Science DMZs. Each has implemented a
framework that allows free flow of data where needed and addresses
HIPAA using alternate, reasonable, and appropriate controls that
manage the risk posed by the absence of stateful or application-layer
firewalls. To that end, each organization has implemented a specific
“risk-managed” DMZ solution that encompasses the entire high-
performance computing, storage, and network infrastructure. In the
following subsections, we describe these architectures in detail.
The Indiana University SciPass Science DMZ
Indiana University’s GlobalNOC15 has a holistic, technical architec-
ture under development called SciPass,16 shown in Figure 2, that lev-
erages a comprehensive NIST-based risk management
framework17,18 to support high-rate data flows that comply with
regulations such as HIPAA.
Today, most IDS and flow sensors are unable to process 100
Gbps on a single server. To support aggregate traffic rates greater
than single-sensor capacity, SciPass provides a load-balancing mech-
anism to allow for the use of an array of sensors, with traffic bal-
anced in such a way as to ensure that packets from the same flow
are examined by the same sensor. This is illustrated in Figure 3.
The SciPass design retains existing firewall infrastructure compo-
nents as a technical control mechanism for all traffic in and out of
the DMZ. Support for large data transfers, which have been shown
to be a problem for most firewalls, is provided through the use of
dynamic per-flow bypass of the firewall for known good data trans-
fers. Bypassing is accomplished by reconfiguring the forwarding
path on the OpenFlow Switch16 to forward around the firewall and
IDS after the flow is deemed acceptable via IDS examination, as
Figure 2. The SciPass system contains 6 components: an OpenFlow switch,19
the SciPass controller, a cluster of IDS sensors, a PerfSONAR host,20 a fire-
wall, a network flow analysis system, and a DTN. The integration of these 6
components is designed to provide a secure, performant DMZ with a detailed
history of all DMZ activity and a suite of tools to troubleshoot performance
problems when they inevitably arise. The design also enhances network se-
curity with duty separation. In operation, the SciPass system can be adminis-
tered by one set of individuals, with another set responsible for the individual
DTNs. Both the DTNs and the SciPass switch would provide firewalling func-
tions, with SciPass having enhanced temporal and address granularity.
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shown in Figure 4. This technique provides substantially improved
end-to-end performance and reduces infrastructure costs by not hav-
ing the IDS and firewall examine large volumes of traffic known to
be uninteresting.
SciPass relies on IDS policies to identify “good” flows. These
policies can contain a combination of time of day and day of the
week, source and destination IP address, along with protocol and
application-layer data to determine whether a flow should bypass an
institutional firewall. For a user who uploads HIPAA data to the
same facility across the country every Friday from a local DTN, Sci-
Pass could be configured to only bypass the firewall when transfers
are made from a specific directory to a remote facility on Friday be-
tween 2 and 8 a.m. The policy allows users, network administrators,
and security administrators to jointly define and enforce desired net-
work behavior.
When the system determines that it is appropriate to route an in-
dividual flow around the firewall, a pair of higher-priority Open-
Flow rules is added to the switch so that packets associated with the
flow are directly forwarded, bypassing the institutional firewall and
the IDS array. These rules contain an idle timeout to purge the rules
once the flow completes. In essence, the system performs the same
state tracking that a firewall does, and in appropriate situations
optimizes the firewall out of the forwarding path. By doing so, oper-
ators reduce cost by using a lower-capacity firewall – for instance,
one capable of supporting only 1–10Gbps transfers – while data
transfers to or from the local DTN approach 40–100 Gbps.
SciPass is agnostic to the transfer protocols and local security
measures employed on the DTN, and the model today places the re-
sponsibility for file and session encryption entirely on the DTN. For
restricted data that require the use of file or session encryption, Sci-
Pass, and in particular the IDS, needs to be aware of what applica-
tions are permitted. However, SciPass can assist with the detection
of privacy policy violations by adding Honeytokens or known bogus
test records to the datasets and instructing the IDS to look for these
patterns absent from conforming data transfers.
Future work at Indiana University will focus on how to effec-
tively address HIPAA needs through the application and evolution
of the SciPass architecture.
Figure 3. By default, traffic is forwarded through the institutional firewall via
the OpenFlow switch. As this happens, copies of packets are sent to the array
of IDS and flow analysis system sensors. SciPass uses a balancing mecha-
nism that ensures that all packets for a given flow go to the same sensor for
stream reassembly, and that flows are distributed as evenly as possible
across the array of sensors. Using this approach allows for monitoring of in-
dividual 100 Gbps network connections using an array of 1 or 10 Gbps–capa-
ble sensors. SciPass supports the notion of sensor groups, where there can
be a group of 3 different arrays of sensors that all need a copy of the same
packet; this allows, for instance, the running of multiple types of IDS and flow
analysis sensors. In testing and campus deployments, a combination of Bro,
Snort, and Argus has been used. As copies of each packet are sent to an IDS,
another copy is sent to a flow analysis system, which records summary
records of all traffic in and out of the DMZ. These summaries are analogous
to the level of detail contained in a typical residential phone bill and include
the time of the transfer, the source and destination, the application used, and
the volume data. They also contain information about packet loss or other
performance problems observed in the flow. They do not, however, contain
any of the data transmitted. These records are used for security and perfor-
mance analysis purposes. On the performance side, the Argus utility has
been used within the SciPass system to provide nonsampled flow account-
ing. For Transmission Control Protocol flows, it is able to passively detect per-
formance impairments such as improperly tuned end hosts and packet loss.
This makes it possible for DMZ operators to proactively detect performance
issues without having to rely solely on end user reports and active testing of
network performance. When performance problems are identified, the Perf-
SONAR utility is used to actively test the network path to help determine if
the problems are network- or end system–based.
Figure 4. At the point that the SciPass system determines a flow is trustwor-
thy, it will reprogram switch forwarding to bypass the firewall and IDS sys-
tems to reduce operational cost and improve network efficiency. For larger
data transfers, this technique provides performance unconstrained by the
firewall’s limitations.
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Harvard University
Running shared computing with open, national, and international
network connections with collaborating researchers is clearly
orthogonal to the methodologies required when managing and sup-
porting restricted data. Supporting complex Data Use Agreements
(DUAs) has also become increasingly more difficult, with serious fede-
ral and inordinately large financial penalties for any and all violations.
How does Harvard balance these 2 issues, maintaining open ac-
cess to research faculty while controlling who has access? Given that
it is the individual who physically signs the DUA, Harvard accord-
ingly protects at the level of that individual and his or her sponsoring
faculty. Dedicated systems are placed inside a firewall, with dedi-
cated VPNs controlled by the user’s defined Organizational Unit
from the domain controller. Individual machines are secured, logged,
backed up, monitored, and sandboxed from the main shared cluster.
Only fully deidentified data based on the DUA are allowed within
the shared environment. Thus, there is security, but there is no shar-
ing (except for fully deidentified data). Of course, this does not scale.
Recently, virtualization of encrypted virtual devices has enabled
some degree of scaling and “shared hosting.” The virtual
“container” and virtual network isolation removes the ability for an
individual user to see any other user and/or system from inside of his
or her system. Given that DUAs actively prohibit any and all shar-
ing, the system needs to be designed accordingly, but once again,
this unfortunately results in secure systems that do not scale.
Then there is the issue of data transfer. Because of the limitation
to secure the endpoint via VPNs, the data pass through a Secure
Sockets Layer appliance onto the private secured system via a dedi-
cated encrypted tunnel. Harvard is effectively performing the digital
equivalent of taking a virtual “armored” network cable out to its
end user community, pulling “virtual wires” on an individual basis
through the VPN.
Harvard bases its architecture on the “locked computer room”
model, where, traditionally, health care records could only be
accessed from stand-alone systems behind physical locked doors.
The VPN, user ID, and 2-factor authentication enable access to the
physical or virtual machine, with a subsequent login to finally access
that system. Logs are pulled to a central facility that cannot be
accessed, so chain of custody exists in the event of any issue. Back-
ups are pulled to an offsite secured system.
Harvard medical computing leadership now works with the pro-
vost’s Office for Research, in that any DUAs or requests for datasets
are automatically passed to the assistant dean for research comput-
ing, and a conversation is then started with a documented process
Figure 5. Diagram of the Medical Science DMZ architecture at Harvard University.
Figure 6. Diagram of the Bionimbus Science DMZ architecture at the Univer-
sity of Chicago. As shown, with this architecture, the University of Chicago
does not use a commercial firewall between the storage and compute nodes
and Science DMZ per se, but instead has a number of “compensating” con-
trols and procedures to provide the required security. The traffic between the
commodity and research networks and the applications portals is standard
web traffic, and these connections can use firewalls.
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with the principal faculty member to design the specific system with
sufficient security, speed, capacity, and capability.
After 3 years under this operating model, Harvard has observed
that the research computing organization has become significantly
more efficient. However, the DUA that comes directly from the data
provider still becomes the bottleneck; each is like a snowflake. They
are unique and special, and although they look similar from a dis-
tance, close up, no two are quite alike. Virtualization has thus far
been the toolkit for research computing to be able to exploit shared
physical infrastructure for velocity and agility, but remaining as re-
stricted and controlled “containers” for each project to allow for
segregation and separation. Configuration management has also en-
abled “templates,” to ensure that the systems have appropriate log-
ging, backup, software stack, and access controls; in light of recent
Secure Sockets Layer flaws, this has been invaluable to be able to
rapidly and automatically patch systems at risk. The configuration
management database and automation are critical to maintaining
control of the “one-off” project-based systems.
Self-provisioning of secure private tunnels with encrypted under-
lying storage and isolation of the containerized system is clearly
where we need to be. Effectively, traditional university systems are
behind the curve from a pure technology perspective, but clearly
very much aligned in terms of policy, access control, and documen-
tation. Science DMZ flexibility is the telecommunications equivalent
of the “last mile” of security for restricted data sets.
Bionimbus protected data cloud and data commons
architecture
Over the past 4 years, the University of Chicago, in collaboration
with the not-for-profit Open Cloud Consortium, has developed and
operated cloud-based computing infrastructure and data commons
for the biomedical research community with a common technical ar-
chitecture but different exposed services. Both of these are private
and are housed at one of the University of Chicago data centers, and
both support high-performance data transport through the Science
DMZ that are tightly integrated with the security services of the ap-
plication. Both also employ the NIST risk management framework
and implement a large number of NIST 800-53 controls.
Key architecture decisions include the following:
• All network traffic from outside the application to the computing
and storage infrastructure pass through one or more “head
nodes,” which are heavily monitored. In this sense, the storage
nodes and computing nodes are not “connected directly to the
Internet,” which is a requirement of many of our applications.
• Iptables host-based firewall rules are used to restrict access to the
system.
• Only authenticated and authorized users may access computing
and storage services and controlled access and sensitive data as-
sociated with the applications. This access is only through public
and private encryption keys, with paths that are routed through
the head node. No password-based access is used in the applica-
tion’s nodes, except for accessing the application portal.
• All remote access to the system is monitored, and all access to
the data and to the applications services is also monitored. The
corresponding log files are reviewed regularly for irregularities
and potential breaches.
• The University of Chicago regularly scans and run a variety of in-
formation security services across the entire infrastructure and
records the results of these scans.
• High-performance utilities for moving data through the Science
DMZ to connected organizations can only be initiated by au-
thenticated and authorized users and are fully logged and regu-
larly reviewed.
• Traffic containing sensitive or restricted data, including traffic us-
ing high-performance data transport protocols through the Sci-
ence DMZ, is encrypted.
SUMMARY
The national high-performance network and storage infrastructure
provides an attractive, scalable alternative to the risk and cost of
implementing clouds to handle the biomedical data avalanche and
Table 1. Sample risk matrix for high-speed transfers
Risk How mitigated
Since there is no firewall, an attacker will discover open ports. Only 3 ports are open. The IDS will detect port scans and generate alerts.
The attacker launches a denial of service (DoS) attack. The IDS will detect and stop a DoS attack.
The attacker steals/guesses a user password and gains access to the
user’s data.
The system has a very small number of users. They have been trained to
detect phishing, etc., and encrypt data prior to storage. Long pass-
phrases are mandatory. The passphrase strength is very high.
The attacker exploits unpatched software accessible through open
ports.
System is patched within 6 hours of a critical vulnerability.
The attacker gains system entry and engages in suspicious activity. Logs are sent to a central log host and monitored in real time using a secu-
rity information event management system. Alerts are generated when
suspicious activity signatures are detected.
A successful attack is detected. Mature incident response and reporting procedures are in place. System is
immediately isolated.
To understand how a risk-based DMZ works for HIPAA-aligned data-intensive flows, consider data transfers between a supercomputer and the high-
performance data storage system in a Medical Science DMZ. Neither system uses a firewall; a user can transfer data at a high transfer rate between the two. Both
the supercomputer and the high-performance storage system have been HIPAA aligned, as described earlier. They implement a large number of baseline NIST
800-53 controls,17 which, when supplemented by enterprise common NIST controls, act as alternate controls that lower or mitigate the risk of data exposure due
to the absence of firewalls. Table 1 shows a sampling of how risk is analyzed. Risks found are balanced against the need to transfer large volumes of data to ac-
complish research goals, history of attacks, cost, etc. As mentioned in “Classical Science DMZ” section, we stress that while DTNs can be seen as an exposed sin-
gle point of failure, the Medical Science DMZ architecture focuses risk on them by design, thus emphasizing the key parts of the architecture that require
hardening and monitoring.
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the computational workflows they entail. We have defined a Medi-
cal Science DMZ as a potential institutional approach to solving the
security and regulatory issues introduced by HIPAA, and described
several production implementations where this architecture is al-
ready being deployed to support research with sensitive data at
scale.
The Medical Science DMZ is able to transfer data at high
throughput by ensuring that endpoints are HIPAA aligned and imple-
ment a risk management framework such as NIST, thus introducing
alternate controls that lower or mitigate the risk of data exposure due
to the absence of packet-filter firewalls. Finally, we described several
production implementations where this architecture is already being
deployed to support research with restricted data at scale.
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